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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: ECOSOC, SGEN, SOCI, SHUM

SUBJECT: THIRD COMMITTEE - GENERAL ASSESSMENT

REF: A) USUN 5671 B) USUN 5673

1. SUMMARY: PREDICTABLY, THE THIRD COMMITTEE SPENT THE MAJORITY OF ITS TIME AND ENERGY ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEALT WITH OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, DECADE FOR WOMEN, AND NARCOTICS, IN A PERFUNCTORY WAY. IN EVALUATING THE RESULTS OF THE 32ND GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN THE THIRD COMMITTEE. WE COME UP WITH A MEASURE OF DISAPPOINTMENT OVER INABILITY TO SUCCEED IN ESTABLISHING THE POST OF HIGH COMMISSIONER AND ONLY SMALL PROGRESS IN MOVING AWAY FROM THE "DOUBLE STANDARD" OF CRITICIZING ONLY ISRAEL, CHILE AND SOTH AFRICA WHILE IGNORING ALL OTHERS. ON THE OTHER HAND, USUN BELIEVES WE MADE SOME PROGRESS TOWARDS ESTABLISHING A BETTER WORKING AT-MOSPHERE. ENCOURAGING BROADER PARTICIPATION IN HUMAN RIGHTS DEBATES, ENCOURAGING CONSTRUCTIVE INITIATIVES FROM NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES AND ATTEMPTING TO BRIDGE THE GAP OF MIS-UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE WESTERN CONFIDENTIAL.

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GROUP AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. END SUMMARY.

2. HUMAN RIGHTS: PRIOR TO THE SESSION, THE U.S. AND OTHER WESTERN STATES DECIDED TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON TWO MAIN AREAS, THE COSTA-RICAN PROPOSAL FOR A HIGH COMMISSIONER, AND THE AGENDA ITEM ON TORTURE. WHILE THE HIGH COMMISSIONER PROPOSAL DID NOT PASS, IT

REMAINS A VIABLE PROPOSAL AND WILL BE FURTHER STUDIED BY THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. WHILE THIS IS CONSIDERED BY SOME AS A MEANS OF PREVENTING FURTHER ACTION ON THE PROPOSAL, THERE IS STILL OPPORTUNITY FOR CARRYING THE PROPOSAL FORWARD. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER PROPOSAL HAS ALWAYS BEEN HIGHLY CONTROVERSAIL, BUT WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN HAVING A DISCUSSION OF THE IDEA WITHOUT -- AS SOME PREDICTED -- DESTROYING THE CLIMATE OF THE COMMITTEE. (REF. A PROVIDES DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER PROPOSAL.)

3. TORTURE IS BECOMING A POPULAR SUBJECT FOR INITIA-TIVES AND THERE WERE SEVERAL PROPOSALS UNDER CONSIDERA-TION THIS YEAR. THE SWEDISH PROPOSAL ON AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION, A DUTCH PROPOSAL CALLING FOR A QUESTIONAIRE TO GOVERNMENTS ABOUT TORTURE, AND INDIAN PROPOSAL CALLING FOR STATES TO MAKE A UNILATERAL DECLARATION AGAINST TORUTURE AND A U.S. PROPOSAL CALLING FOR A WORKING GROUP TO INVESTIGATE TORTURE. THE U.S. PROPOSAL WAS THE MOST FAR-REACHING AND ACTION ORIENTED AND THUS THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL. EVEN THOUGH WE COULD NOT MUSTER ENOUGH SUPPORT TO JUSTIFY TABLING THE RESOLUTION, THE EXISTENCE OF THE PROPOSAL SERVED A VERY USEFUL PURPOSE BY PROVIDING A KIND OF COVERING SHIELD FOR THE DUTCH PROPOSAL WHICH WAS THE SECOND MOST CONTROVERSIAL IDEA. IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SO CONFIDENTIAL.

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EASILY ACCEPTED IF THE THREAT OF AN EVEN "WORSE" PROPOSAL -- THE U.S. RESOLUTION -- HAD NOT BEEN HOVERING IN THE BACKGROUND. A LAST MINUTE PROPOSAL FROM THE AFRICAN GROUP, THE RESOLUTION ON THE BIKO CASE, WAS KEPT MODERATE THROUGH STRONG WESTERN INTEREST, AND WAS ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS.

4. U.S. BEHIND-THE-SCENES EFFORTS TO FIND A WAY,
BY MEANS OF ANOTHER RESOLUTION, TO SEPARATE THE ZIONISM/
RACISM RESOLUTION FROM THE GOALS OF THE DECADE FOR ACTION
TO COMBAT RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND SPECIFICALLY FROM THE GOALS OF THE PLANNED 1978 WORLD CONFERENCE,
WERE NOT SUCCESSFUL. HOWEVER, OUR ATTEMPTS WERE
PERCEIVED AS SINCERE AND WERE MET WITH A CERTAIN AMOUNT
OF ENCOURAGEMENT FROM ARAB STATES. OUR EFFORTS WERE
BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT SOME OF THE MODERATE
ARAB STATES AND AFRICANS WOULD COOPERATE AND EVEN
WELCOME AN OPPORUTNITY TO PUSH RESOLUTION 3379 AS
FAR INTO THE BACKGROUND AS POSSIBLE. THEY HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT THE ZIONISM/RACISM RESOLUTION HAS BEEN
SEVERELY DAMAGING TO THEIR INTERESTS AND IMAGE IN
THE UNITED STATES AND THEY PERCEIVE THAT IT IS IN

THEIR INTEREST TO CORRECT THE SITUATION. OUR EFFORTS WERE FINALLY BROUGHT TO A HALT FOLLOWING ARAB DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE U.S. ABSTENTION ON THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS RESOLUTION SPONSORED BY EGYPT. THE BREAKUP OF ARAB UNITY FOLLOWING THE ISRAELI/EGYPTIAN PEACE MOVES PRECLUDED THOUGHTS OF ANY LAST MINUTE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFERENCE.

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5. AN UNEXPECTED SUCCESS WAS THE U.S. ROLE IN NEGOTIA-TION OF A CONSENSUS RESOLUTION ON THE QUESTION OF MISSING PERSONS IN CYPRUS. THIS ISSUE, WHICH DID NOT OCCUPY MUCH PRE-UNGA PLANNING TIME, TOOK UP AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF DELEGATION TIME, BUT WAS WELL WORTH THE EFFORT, AS IT IS ONE OF THE FEW ISSUES ON WHICH WE MIGHT SEE IMMEDIATE TANGIBLE RESULTS.

6. A FURTHER SUCCESSFUL, THOUGH SMALL ACCOMPLISHMENT WAS WITH RESPECT TO THE ACTION TAKEN ON THE UGANDA ISSUE IN WHICH THE U.S. ENCOURAGED OTHER DELEGATIONS TO TAKE THE LEAD IN TABLING A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR UN ACTION WITH RESPECT TO VIOLTATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN UGANDA. WHILE THE U.S. HAD HEAVY PUBLIC PRESSURE TO TAKE THE LEAD ON THE ISSUE, WE RECOGNIZED THAT IT WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AND EVEN ENDANGER THE LIVES OF AMERICAN IN UGANDA IF THE

U.S. WERE TO BE SEEN AS THE LEADER OF THIS MOVE.
THIS ACTION SERVES AS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THE USEFULNESS
OF PUTTING FINAL GOALS ABOVE THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR
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OWN PUBLIC IMAGE.

7. AN UNEXPECTED RESULT OF THE UGANDAN RESOLUTION OFFERRED BY THE NORDICS WAS THE PRESENTATION BY NIGERIA OF A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF ESTABLISHING REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS IN REGIONS WHERE THEY DO NOT NOW EXIST. FOR FEAR OF OFFENDING THE AFRICAN BLOC IN THE COMMITTEE THE SOVIET DELEGATE WENT ALONG WITH MORE THAN HIS TWO SEMI-INDEPENENT ALLIES (CUBA AND YUGOSLAVIA) WANTED, ALTHOUGH THE RESOLUTION WAS PASSED IN A SOMEWHAT WEAKENED FORM. THE SUDDEN APPEARANCE ON THE SCENE OF AN ACTIVE NIGERIAN LOBBYING EFFORT UPSET CONSIDERABLY THE USUAL "CLUB" THAT OSTENSIBLY SPEAKS FOR THE NON-ALIGNED: CUBA, IRAN, EGYPT, YUGOSLAVIA, ETC. FOR THE FIRST TIME THE AFRICANS WERE VISIBLE. AND IN INITIATIVE UNRELATED TO SOUTH AFRICA WAS TAKEN BY AN AFRICAN NATION IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT UNANIMOUS SUPPORT HAD BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO SECURE FROM THE AFRICANS.

8. THE CHILE RESOLUTION THIS YEAR GAINED ALMIST SOLID EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR THE FIRST TIME, WITH ONLY SPAIN ABSTAINING. THE DEBATE WAS PREDICTABLE, AND THE OPPOSITION CAME FROM ABOUT TWELVE LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS, PLUS A SPRINKLING OF OTHER NATIONS, MOST OF WHOM (I.E. THE ASEANS WHO ALL ABSTAINED) WERE CONCERNED THAT THE SAME SHOE MIGHT FIT IF APPLIED TO THEM, OR WHO HAVE MADE PARTICULAR INTERPRETATIONS OF SPECIAL WORKING GROUPS AS INTERVENTIONS IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS. THE CHILEANS CONTINUED THEIR PREVIOUS PRACTICE OF ATTEMPTING TO DISCREDIT THOSE MOST CLOSELY INVOLVED WITH THE CHILE RESOLUTION AND TO CLAIM THAT CONFIDENTIAL

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A FEW INDIVIDUALS ARE BEHIND THE ANTI-CHILE RESOLUTION. SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WORKING GROUP IN 1975 THE CHILEANS HAVE ASSERTED THAT THEY WOULD HAVE ADMITTED THE GROUP EXCEPT FOR THE FACT THE CHAIRMAN ALLANA WAS IMPOSSIBLY BIASED AND UNACCEPTABLE TO THEM. LAST YEAR THE CHILEANS AIMED THEIR CAMPAIGN AT THE

CUBANS AND AT THE NETHERLANDS DELEGATE, THEO VAN BOVEN WAS WAS SUBJECTED TO THE SAME KIND OF PERSONAL ATTACK AS WAS HEAPED ON THE U.S. AT THIS SESSION. VAN BOVEN, WHO IS NOW DIRECTOR OF THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS DIVISION, WAS ACCUSED OF BEING MORE HARD-LINE THAN THE CUBANS AND MORE SOVIET THAN THE SOVIETS. THE PASSAGE OF THE CHILE RESOLUTION LEAVES ONE WITH A FEELING OF UNEASINESS AND SOMETHING LESS THAN A SENSE OF ACCOMP-LISHMENT. IN THE CASE OF CHILE. THE WEST IS FACED WITH JOINING IN AN EXERCISE IN HYROCRISY WHICH BEGAN AS A SOVIET/CUBAN INITIATIVE -- OR REFUSING TO JOIN IN CONDEMNATION OF OBVIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BECAUSE WE DON'T LIKE THE POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF SOME OF THE CO-SPONSORS OF THE RESOLUTION AND BECAUSE THEIR MOTIVES ARE OBVIOUSLY COMPLETELY DIVORCED FROM A DESIRE TO PROMOTE INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS.

9. THE DECADE FOR WOMEN: THE U.S. DELEGATION DEVOTED A LARGE PORTION OF TIME TO THE WORKING GROUP ON THE DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN, A WORKING GROUP WHICH MET TWO OR THREE TIMES A WEEK. IN SPITE OF SINCERE EFFORTS BY MOST DELEGATIONS TO ACCOMPLISH THE TASK (SEE SEPTEL USUN 5763) THE GROUP FINISHED ONLY HALF OF THE CONVENTION AND WILL RECONVENE NEXT YEAR TO CONTINUE ITS WORK. THE CONVENTION SHOULD THUS BE PRESENTED AT THE END OF THE 33RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY FOR ADOPTION.

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10. THE UNITED STATES WAS BY FAR THE LARGEST DONOR, CONTRIBUTING A TOTAL OF \$3 MILLION, AT THE PLEDGING CONFERENCE FOR THE UN DECADE FOR WOMEN, AND THE U.S. CONTRIBUTION PROVIDED AN ESSENTIAL BOOST TO THE WOMEN'S PROGRAMS. THE UNITED STATES PARTICIPATED IN THE EARLY NEGOTIATIONS ONTHE MAJORITY OF DRAFT RESOLU-TIONS UNDER THE WOMEN'S PROGRAM AND WAS ABLE TO GET DELETION OF UNACCEPTABLE POLITICAL REFERENCES (REFERENCES TO RESOLUTIONS PERTAINING TO THE DECLARA-TION OF MEXICO, AND SOME OF THE RELATED RESOLUTIONS -WHICH CONTAINED CONDEMNATIONS OF ZIONISM). THE U.S. CO-SPONSORED TWO OF THE RESOLUTIONS, ONE ON THE VOLUNTARY FUND AND ONE ON THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE. OUR CO-SPONSORSHIP OF THE RESOLUTION ON THE INSTITUTE WAS MORE OF AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OUR \$400,000 CONTRIBUTION THAN A MEASURE OF ENTHUSIASM FOR THE INSTITUTE, AS THE MISSION CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INSTITUTE. OF THE ESTIMATED \$3 MILLION REQUIRED TO BEGIN OPERATIONS. CONFIDENTIAL

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ONLY \$1,6 MILLION HAS BEEN PLEDGED TO DATE. OF THIS SUM, IRAN HAS PLEDGED \$1 MILLION AND THE U.S. \$400,000. IN PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS, DEVELOPING COUNTRY DELEGATIONS BEGAN TO EXPRESS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE WISDOM OF HOLDING THE NEXT WOMEN'S CONFERENCE IN 1980 IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE LAST CONFERENCE WAS JUST IN 1975 AND HOLDING SUCH A CONFERENCE WOULD SERVE TO SIPHON POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS AWAY FROM THE VOLUNTARY FUND WHICH IS USED FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND INTO COSTLY ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE. THE RESOLUTION ON THE WORLD CONFERENCE WAS THUS MADE LESS SPECIFIC AS TO THE TIME OF THE NEXT CONFERENCE, WHICH IS STILL TERMED A MID-TERM CONFERENCE, BUT MAY WELL BE DELAYED UNTIL 1981 OR 82.

11. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: THE PLIGHT OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN THE UN HAS NOT BEEN EASED IN ANY MEASURABLE WAY AT THIS SESSION. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS ARE DISCUSSED IN A FRAGMENTED AND ESULTORY FASHION AND THE COMMITTEE IS FOR THE MOST PART INATTENTATIVE. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, THE NORDICS, THE DUTCH AND THE U.S. HAVE TRADITIONALLY HAD THE MOST INTEREST IN SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT QUESTIONS. A FEW OTHER DELEGATIONS GET INVOLVED ON SPECIFIC ISSUES. MALTA HAS A STRONG INTERESTIN QUESTIONS OF THE AGING AND LIBYA ORIGINATED

A RESOLUTION ON AN INTERNATIONAL YEAR FOR THE DISABLED. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IS ONE AREA WHERE ADDITIONAL FOCUS AND PLANNING ARE REQUIRED.

12. THE U.S. SPONSORED TWO SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTIONS DEALING WITH SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUES. THE U.S. INITIATIVE CALLING FOR GOVERNMENT COMMENTS ON AN CONFIDENTIAL

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INTERNATIONAL YEAR AND A WORLD ASSEMBLY ON AGING WAS ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS. THIS SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, BE CONSTRUED AS A SIGN OF BROAD SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL YEAR OR PARTICULARLY FOR A CONFERENCE. AS THE RESOLUTION ONLY REQUIRED COMMENTS ON THESE PROPOSALS, SUPPORT OF THE RESOLUTION IN NO WAY IMPLIED A COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT A YEAR OR AN ASSEMBLY. A SECOND U.S. INITIATIVE, DEALING WITH NARCOTICS, CALLED FOR INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN THE FIELD OF TREATMENT AND REHABILITATION.

13. POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS

CHAIRMAN

THE COMMITTEE WAS FORTUNATE TO HAVE AS CHAIRMAN MS. LUCILLE MAIR, JAMAICA, WHO WAS UNIVERSALLY RESPECTED AND WHO SOUGHT TO EXERCISE HER FUNCTIONS IN AS EVEN-HANDED MANNER AS POSSIBLE, WITHOUT SHOWING FAVORITISM TO ANY REGIONAL OR POLITICAL GROUP.

US/EC-9/WESTERN GROUP

THE EC-9 APPEARED TO HAVE INCREASING DIFFICULTY REACHING AGREEMENT AMONG THEMSELVES. THEY FREQUENTLY EXHAUST THEIR ENERGIES REACHING AGREEMENT WITHIN THE GROUP WHICH LEAVES THEM WITH AN INFLEXIBLE POSITION FOR OTHERS TO ACCEPT OR REJECT, THE SAME PROCESS WHICH OFTEN OCCURS WITH THE G-77. THE EC-9 USUALLY EXPECT THE U.S. AND CANADA TO GO ALONG WITH THEIR POSITION, EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE SOMETIMES ANNOUNCED ON SHORT NOTICE.

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THE EC-9 ADOPTED FREQUENT SPLIT POSITIONS, WITH DENMARK AND THE NETHERLANDS EXERTING THE MOST LIBERAL PULL ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES AND FRANCE AND THE FRG IN THE CONSERVATIVE CORNER. THE EC-9 HAVE AN INTERNAL RULE THAT ONE MEMBERS POSITION WILL NEVER BE MORE THAN TWO DEGREES AWAY FROM ANY OTHER MEMBERS, THE DEGREES BEING CO-SPONSORSHIP, YES - ABSTAIN - NO. THE BIGGEST PROBLEM WAS IN RELATION TO THE CHILE RESOLTION WHICH THE NETHERLANDS AND UK CO-SPONSORED AND ON WHICH FRANCE WISHED TO VOTE NO. THE MEMBERS OF THE EC-9 REACTED IN VARYING WAYS TO INCREASED U.S. ACITIVITY AND INITIATIVES IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA. FRANCE, FRG, AND THE UK WERE FOR THE MOST PART DISCONCERTED AND REACTED NERVOUSLY, WHEREAS U.S. POSITONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS RESOLUTIONS ERE IN THE PAST MORE PRE-DICTABLE AND GENERALLY REPRESENTED THE MOST CONSERVATIVE END OF THE SPECTRUM, THE EC-9 FOUND THAT THIS YEAR, U.S. PSITIONS WERE NOT AS PREDICTABLE, AND PARTICULARLY FRANCE AND THE FRG AND TO SOME EXTENT THE UK WERE UNCOMFORTABLE FINDING THEMSLEVES SOMEWHERE TO THE RIGHT OF THE U.S. ON SOME ISSUES. WITHOUT THE U.S. AS A RIGHT FLANK FLAK CATCHER, THEY WERE MORE CONFIDENTIAL

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RELUCTANT TO TAKE CERTAIN POSITIONS. THE NETHERLANDS TENDED TO ENCOURAGE MORE ACTIVE U.S. PARTICIPATION AND FOUND THAT HAVING THE U.S. OUT IN FRONT HELPED TO TAKE A GREAT DEAL OF PRESSURE AWAY FROM THEM. FOR EXAMPLE, THE U.S. PROPOSAL ON TORUTURE WAS MORE FAR-REACHING AND CONTROVERSIAL THAN THE DUTCH PROPOSAL AND SERVED TO MAKE THE DUTCH PROPOSAL LOOK REASONABLE BY COMPARISON.

THE DUTHC WERE ALSO RELIEVED TO BE OUT FROM

UNDER THE CHILEAN VILIFICATION CAMPAIGN DISCUSSED EARLIER WHICH WAS THIS YEAR DIRECTED AT THE U.S. THE BELGIAN THIRD COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN OF THE EC-9 AND ALSO OF THE WESTERN GROUP WAS EXTRAORDINARILY HARD-WORKDING AND CON-SCIENTIOUS AND RELIEVED OTHER MEMBERS OF A GREAT DEAL OF WORK BY SERVING AS CO-ORDINATOR AND INFORMATION CLEARING HOUSE. THE FRG FREQUENTLY COMPLAINED OF U.S. FAILURE TO CO-ORDINATE OR LACK OF CONSULTATION -- WHICH WAS IN OUR VIEW DUE TO DIFFERENCES OF SUBSTANCE NOT DUE TO FAILURE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS OR CO-ORDINATE POSITIONS. THE FRENCH FELT THEMSELVES ISOLATED AND ABANDONED. (ON THE CHILE RESOLUTION AND ON THE CONTENTIOUS RESOLUTION ON THE FUTURE HUMAN RIGHTS WORK OF THE UN (EARLIER KNOWN AS L.17)). THE FRENCH DUG IN AND INSISTED ON BLOCKING A CONSENSUS OF L.17, CALLING FOR VOTE IN ORDER TO REGISTER THEIR ABSTENTION.

WESTERN GROUP - OR LIKE MINDED GROUP
THE WESTERN GROUP (OR LIKE-MINDED) MET FREQUENTLY AND
AT LENGTH, IN THE EARLY PART OF THE SESSION TO DISCUSS
THE HIGH COMISIIONER PROPOSAL AND LATER ON TO DEAL
WITH THE NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION ON THE FUTURE WORK OF
THE UN IN HUMAN RIGHTS (L.17). THE GROUP TERMS ITSELF
LIKE-MINDED RATHER THAN WESTERN GROUP BECAUSE SOME
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MEMBERS OF THE WEO GROUP ARE PURPOSEDLY EXCLUDED (MALTA) OR ARE NOT INTERSTED (TURKEY). THIS YEAR DUE TO THE ISSUES, I.E. HIGH COMMISSIONER, THE GROUP INCLUDED LATINS, MOST OFTEN COSTA RICA AND VENEZUELA OR COLOMBIA. WHILE THE POSITIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE LIKE-MINDED GROUP VARIED WIDELY ON SOME ISSUES, MEMBERS NEARLY ALWAYS EXCHANGED INFORMATION AND CONSULTED PRIOR TO COMMITTEE VOTES. THE U.S. AS A MATTER OF PRACTICE CO-ORDINATED VOTING PLANS WITH THE EC-9, CANADA, JAPAN, AUSTRALIA, THE NORDIC GROUP, ISREAL AND SPAIN. THE C-9. WESTERN GROUP AND U.S. CAN BE FAULTED FOR. IF ANYTHING, STICKING TOO CLOSELY TOGETHER AND NOT SHOWING ENOUGH FLEXIBILITY TOWARD INCLUDING OTHER DELEGATIONS IN THEIR WOR. THE EC-9 HAVE THE MOST CLOSED SHOP APPROACH, WHILE THE NORDICS ARE MORE FORTHCOMING IN WORKING WITH OTHER DELEGATIONS. THIS YEAR, FINLAND EXERCISED MORE LEADER-SHIP THAN THE OTHER NORDICS, ALTHOUGH THE NORWEGIAN DELEGATION WAS THE CHIEF WORK HORSE FOR THE HIGH COMMISSIONER RESOLUTION. THE SWEDES FLOAT ON A CLOUD OF SELF-ESTEEM AND ATTRIBUTE THEIR SUCCESSES IN HUMAN

RIGHTS RESOLUTIONS TO THEIR UNIQUE RAPPORT WITH THE G-77, WHEREAS OTHER MEMBERS OF THE WESTERN GROUP VIEW

SWEDISH ACCOMPLISHMENTS AS THE RESULT OF A TOO READY WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE TO WIN VOTES. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN THE CASE OF THE SWEDISH RESOLUTION ON PLITICAL PRISONERS WHICH WAS ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS THIS YEAR. AT LAST YEAR'S SESSION THE RESOLUTION, AS WELL AS A BYELORUSSIAN DRAFT CALLING FOR RELEASE OF ALL PERSONS IMPRISONED AS A RESULT OF THEIR STRUGGLE FOR SELF-DETERMINATION WERE DEFERRED DUE TO LACK OF AGREEMENT.

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IN THE INTERVENING MONTHS, THE SWEDES PURSUED
THE OPPOSITION AND FINALLY MADE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE
EASTERN GROUP TO AGREE TO ABSTAIN ON, RATHER THAN TRY
TO DEFEAT OR FORCE WITHDRAWAL OF THE BYELORUSSIAN DRAFT
WHICH WAS ORIGINALLY INTENDED TO SERVE ONLY TO PREVENT
ADOPTION OF THE SWEDISH DRAFT. IT WAS
CONSTRUCTED TO BE SO OFFENSIVE TO WESTERN INTERESTS
AS TO CAUSE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SWEDISH DRAFT. THE BYELORUSSIANS HAD NO EXPECTATIONS THAT THE RESOLUTION WOULD GET
TO A VOTE. WE ARE THUS LEFT WITH A WEAK DRAFT ON
POLITICAL PRISONERS AND A SECOND THOROUGHLY UNACCEPTABLE
SOVIET-INSPIRED EFFORT.

EASTERN EUROPEAN GROUP

THE EASTERN EUROPAN GROUP WAS SMOOTHLY RUN BY THE SOVIET DELEGATE SERGEI SMIRNOV WHO IS AN EXPERIENCED

HAND. THE SOVIETS SUFFERED MORE DISCOMFORT THIS YEAR AND HAD TO WORK HARDER ON THEIR RESOLUTIONS. OUR ESTIMATE IS THAT THEIR CAPACITY TO USE ANTI-IMPERIALIST CONFIDENTIAL.

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RHOETORIC TO MOBILIZE A SOLID AND INSTANT MAJORITY BEGAN TO ERODE SERIOUSLY DURING THE SESSION. THE NEW U.S. STANCE ON AFRICAN ISSUES LEFT THE SOVIETS A LESS

FERTILE FIELD FOR SOWING DISTRUST BETWEEN THE AFRICANS AND THE WESTERN STATES. AS IN THE PAST, THE SOVIETS HAD THE LOYAL AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF THE CUBAN DELEGATION AS THE FLAG BEARER FOR THEIR FAVORITE CAUSES. CUBA CO-SPONSORED AND ASSISTED IN THE DRAFTING OF NEARLY ALL OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS RESOLUTIONS. THE CUBAN DELEGATE, MIGUEL ALFONSO, IS EXPERIENCED AND EFFECTIVE AND ALSO HAD TO WORK MUCH HARDER TO MAINTAIN SUPPORT, ESPECIALLY AMONG AFRICAN DELEGATIONS ON SOME ISSUES, AFTER OBSERVING

CHANGES IN U.S. POSITIONS. THE VIETNAMESE DELEGATION WAS SEEN MEETING REGULARLY WITH THE EASTERN EUROPEAN GROUP AND NEARLY ALWAYS VOTED WITH THE EASTERN BLOC. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT VIETNAM BROKE RANKS TO VOTE IN FAVOR OF TWO RESOLUTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL; AN INDICATION OF THEIR INTENT TO REMAIN SOMEWHAT INDEPENDENT AND/ALSO A SIGN OF THEIR INTEREST IN NARCOTICS PROBLEMS.

LATIN AMERICA: THE LATINS AS A GROUP APPEARED LEADERLESS. COSTA RICA REGULARLY CAUCASSED WITH THE WESTERN GROUP AND PRESUMABLY KEPT THE LATIN GROUP WELL INFORMED OF

WESTERN VIEWS SO THAT LATIN DELEGATES HAD LESS REASON THAN USUAL TO SEEK OUT INDIVIDUAL WESTERN STATES FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, THEREBY GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE NOT ACTIVE. THE CHILEANS WERE OF COURSE ACTIVE SEEKING TO DEFEND THEMSELVES, AND THE BRAZILIAN CONFIDENTIAL.

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DELEGATION WORKED OVERTIME TO HELP DEFEAT THE HIGH COMMISSIONER PROPOSALS, BRAZIL IS THE NEW LATIN MEMBER OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND IT WOULD BE WELL

WORTH OUR TIME TO CONSULT WITH THE BRAZILIAN DELEGATES PRIOR TO THE SESSION AS THEY WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE

WELL PREPARED AND ACTIVE.

ASIAN GROUP: DUE TO THE DIVERSITY OF POLITICAL ORIENTATION, THE MEMBERS OF THE ASEAN GROUP DO NOT MAKE ANY ATTEMPT TO WORK TOGEHTER. THE ASEANS (MALAYSIA, SINRAPORE, THAILAND, PHILIPPINES, INDONESIA) COORDINATED

POSITIONS AND GENERALLY VOTED TOGETHER. CHINA REMAINED ALOOF AS USUAL, EXCEPT TO ATTACK THE SUPER-POWERS FROM TIME TO TIME -- WITH STRONGEST CRITICISM RESERVED FOR THE USSR. THE CHINESE DO NOT AS A RULE CO-SPONSOR RESOLUTIONS OR GET INVOLVED WITH NEGOTIATIONS OR DRAFTING. THE CHINESE THIRD COMMITTEE DELEGATE REMARKED THAT THE CHINESE NEVER CO-SPONSOR ANY RESOLUTIONS EXCEPT THE KOREAN RESOLUTION. ACTIVE ASIAN DELEGATIONS, SUCH AS IRAN, PAKISTAN, AND INDIA, WORK THROUGH THE G-77 RATHERN THAN THE REGIONAL GROUPING WHICH IS USED STRICTLY FOR CHOOSING CANDIDATES FOR ELECTIONS.

G-77: THE MOST ACTIVE THIRD COMMITTEE G-77
DELEGATES WERE IRAN, INDIA, YUGOSLAVIA, EGYPT,
MOROCCO, MALI, SENEGAL, KENYA, GHANA, BENIN,
MADAGASCAR, BUA, PAKISTAN, AND ARGENTINA. THESE
DELEGATIONS PRODUCED NEARLY ALL OF THE RESOLUTIONS
ON BEHALF OF THE G-77, THE MOST IMPORTANT OF WHICH
WAS THE RESOLUTION ON FUTURE HUMAN RIGHTS WORK IN
UN BODIES. AT MEETINGS BETWEEN THE WESTERN GROUP
AND THE G-77, THOSE ATTENDING FOR THE G-77 WERE CUBA,
IRAN, PAKISTAN, YUGOSLAVIA, SENEGAL, ARGENTINA, INDIA ...
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THE G-77 WERE MORE FLEXIBLE THIS YEAR THAN

LAST AND MADE GREATER EFFORTS TO ACCOMMODATE WESTERN INTERESTS. THIS WAS IN RESPONSE TO SIMILARLY INCREASED EFFORTS BY THE WESTERN GROUP TO WORK TOWARDS

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AGREEMENT RATHER THAN CONFRONTATION. THE THIRD COM-MITTEE IS TOTALLY LACKING IN STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION WHICH WOULD PERMIT EASY ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONTACT GROUPS AND NEGOTIATING. THE COMMITTEE TENDS TO CARRY OUT ALL OF ITS BUSINESS IN THE CORRIDORS OR ON THE PERIPHERY OF THE MEETING ROOM, WHICH CONTRIBUTES TO THE BEE-HIVE ATMOSPHERE IN THE COMMITTEE. THE G-77. KNOWING THEY HAVE THE MAJORITY OF THE VOTES, HAVE PREFERRED TO OFFER THEIR RESOLUTIONS ON A TAKE IT OR LEAVE BASIS. THIS YEAR, THE WEST HAD TO PLEAD WITH THE G-77 TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CONTENTIOUS L.17 AND THE G-77 FINALLY AGREED TO HOLD MEETINGS ON THE CONDITION THAT THEY NOT BE TERMED "NEGOTIATIONS" AND THAT THE PROCEDURE INVOLVE ONLY AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. IN OUR VIEW THIS FEAR OF OPEN NEGOTIATIONS IS BASED ON A CERTAIN LACK OF CONFIDENCE AT DEALING WITH WESTERN DELEGATES, AND/ ALSO ON A FEAR BY THOSE CONTROLLING THE G-77 (CUBA, IRAN, YUGOSLAVIA, EGYPT) THAT THEIR OWN UNITY COULD NOT BE PRESERVED DURING A REAL NEGOTIATING SESSION WHEREIN THE MODERATES (MOST OFTEN THE AFRICANS SUCH AS SENEGAL, KENYA) WOULD TOO READILY AGREE WITH OR CONFIDENTIAL.

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ACCEPT WESTERN VIEWS. THE G-77 DID COME CLOSE TO PUBLIC DISAGREEMENT DURING ONE OF THE "DISCUSSION" SESSIONS ON L.17 BUT CUBA AND IRAN QUICKLY INTERCEDED TO REMIND PARTICIPANTS THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING DID NOT INCLUDE READHING DECISIONS.

AFRICAN GROUP: THE AFRICAN GROUP DID NOT WORK AS A UNIT OUTSIDE OF THE G-77 UNTIL FACED WITH THE UGANDA ISSUE, AT WHICH TIME THEY DISPLAYED COMPLETE GROUP LOYALTY AND UNITY TO THE OUTSIDE. REPORTS OF THEIR GROUP MEETINGS INDICATED THE DILEMMA POSED BY THE NORDIC RESOLUTION ON UGANDA LED TO

HEATED EXCHANGES WITHIN THE GROUP, BUT THAT THE DESIRE TO MAINTAIN UNITY WAS STRONGER THAN THE WESTERN PRESSURE FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION ON UGANDA.

CONCLUSIONS: WHILE LEADERSHIP ROLES IN THE COMMITTEE REFLECT TO A GREAT EXTENT THE REALITIES OF WORLD POLITICS, THERE ARE NUMEROUS DELEGATES WHO ACHIEVE A DEGREE OF INFLUENCE OR STANDING OUT OF PROPORTION TO THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COUNTRY WHICH THEY REPRESENT. THESE DELEGATIONS CAN BE EXTREMELTY USEFUL IN PROVIDING KEY LINKS BETWEEN GROUPS. FOR EXAMPLE, AUSTRALIA, FINLAND AND PORTUGAL WERE ALL EXTREMELY ACTIVE AND INFLUENTIAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS MATTERS. SENEGAL AND MOROCCO ARE FAR MORE ACTIVE AND INFLUENTIAL THAN THEIR RELATIVE ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL STRENGTH WOULD DICTATE. THE WESTERN GROUP, PARTICULARLY THE EC-9, TENDS TO OVERLOOK THE POSSIBILITY FOR FORMING ISSUE ORIENTED ALLIANCES WITH LIKE-MINDED THIRD WORLD DELEGATES AND THUS HELPS TO MAINTAIN ITS OWN ISOLATION. ONE OF THE USUN OBJECTIVES AT THIS SESSION OF THE GA WAS TO SEEK OUT SUCH LIKE-MINDED NON-ALIGNED CONFIDENTIAL

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ALLIES WHENEVER POSSIBLE. WE FEEL THIS HELPED TO PROMOTE THE INDIAN INITIATIVE ON TORTURE AND TO ENCOURAGE THE NIGERIAN INITIATIVE ON REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MACHINERY.

HUMAN RIGHTS:

FUTURE APPROACH TO INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY CASES: WE SHOULD BE THINKING SERIOUSLY ABOUT OUR FUTURE APPROACH TO INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY CASES, SHOULD WE CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THE KANGAROO COURT APPROACH IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY? AT PRESENT THE GA IS FIXED ON THREE CASES SOUTH AFRICA, ISRAEL, AND CHILE ALL OF WHICH ARE MADE POSSIBLE BY A COMBINATION OF FACTORS, BUT ALL INVOLVING SOVIET INTERST. THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION IS MORE PERMISSIVE WITH RESPECT TO DISCUSSION OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY CASES, AND IN OUR VIEW THIS SHOULD BE FORM IN WHICH TO MAKE ANY MOVES TOWARDS DISCIPLINING OF MEMBER COUNTRIES. THE UGANDA CASE WILL BE BEFORE THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND WE SHOULD EXPECT SOME FORWARD MOTION ON THIS QUESTION. HOWEVER, WE WHOULD CAREFULLY CONSIDER OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE TYPE OF ACTION WE WISH TO SEE TAKEN. SHOULD WE ENCOURAGE ESTABLISHMENT OF ANOTHER AD HOC WORKING GROUP OR SHOULD WE FAVOR GREATER USE OF HIGH LEVEL UN SECRETARIAT OFFICIALS AS TROUBLE-SHOOTERS. A MORE LOW-

PROFILE APPROACH IS, IN OUR VIEW, MORE LIKELY TO BE ACCEPTABLE AND EFFECTIVE.

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WE HAVE ALSO TO CONSIDER THAT THE MOST LIKELY OBJECTS OF FUTURE CONCERTED UN ACTION WILL BE OTHER RIGHT WING GOVERNMENTS -SOUTH KOREA, URUGUAY, PARAGUAY. IF THE UGANDA CASE IS SHELVED AND THESE CASES TAKEN UP -- THE FEELING OF FRUSTRATION AND ACCUSATIONS OF DOUBLE STANDARD BY THE UN WILL STRONGLY INCREASE. WE ARE NOT SUGGESING THAT THE US STOP TRYING TO PUT PRESSURE ON INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES, BUT THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO COME UP WITH OTHER PROCEDURES THAN THE RESOLUTION ON AN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY. THIS COULD INVOLVE GREATER USE OF THE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS,
OR REFERRAL OF CASES TO THEM.IT COULD INVOLVE MORE USE OF, OR ATTEMPTED USE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL AS WAS SUGGESED FOR THE UGANDA CASE.

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